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DONALD NORDBERG 
Enactment or exploration: Two roles for philosophy in the novel of ideas 
Abstract:  This article examines the often-denigrated concept of the novel of 
ideas through its inception, its critical decline, and relatively recent revival. 
Using a variant of the exploitation-exploration dilemma in psychology, it 
suggests that early usage referred to works that exploit philosophical principles 
– or better put, enact them – by setting philosophical positions in conflict. By 
contrast, use of the concept for other, and especially more recent works sees 
characters and plots as exploring philosophical stances. The shift corresponds 
with the greater attention paid to complexity and ambiguity that are hallmarks 
of continental philosophy and neopragmatism, and with it greater need to 
explore philosophical stances through fiction. 
I 
The novel of ideas is a concept whose time has come, again. Critics have embraced the term 
in recent years to categorize a widening range of novels. Many bear little resemblance to the 
social conscious-raising ones of the 19th century that were so labeled when the term “novel of 
ideas” first came into vogue, applied to works by authors including Charles Dickens, George 
Eliot, Leo Tolstoy, Emile Zola. They also seem different to those of the middle years of the 
20th century, depicting the supposed horrors of one political movement or another (e.g., works 
by Yevgeni Zamyatin, George Orwell, Ayn Rand). The label has also been applied to works 
based on perceived social disruption from science or technology development (Mary Shelley, 
H.G. Wells, Robert Heinlein).  
This revival of interest comes as writers of a different philosophical persuasion began to 
attract critical attention applying that banner. The themes of science and uncertainty in the 
works of Thomas Pynchon and William Gaddis sometimes called “systems novels” have been 
labelled as being “of ideas.” So, too, works often considered “postmodern.”  
That the category is somehow in vogue is evident from fresh critical discussion of its 
shortcomings as much at its merits. There are positive echoes in studies concerning the overlap 
between the essay and novels,1 and between such novels and drama.2 Not all the attention is 
supportive, however. While defending the category, LeMahieu notes that it is “consistently 
subject to denigration.”3 A very recent example is Ngai’s critical account of limit range of 
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techniques used in works that fall under that label, mechanisms that limit characterization.4 
Bewes challenges the “intellectual honesty” works written in this tradition.5 
This article extends these critiques but steps back from their normative stance. Instead, it 
analyzes the concept using a lens drawn from psychology and cognition studies: the distinction 
between exploration and exploitation and the dilemma it presents. I argue that critics use the 
term “novel of ideas” in different ways: Initially it referred to works in which characters 
embody philosophical positions; they then engage through the devices of plot and narrative in 
a contest of those stances with others. These authors, and the characters they created, exploit 
settled philosophical positions or, more precisely, enact a philosophical debate.  
By contrast, I argue that a different understanding applies in the recent revival of the term, 
as applied to works belonging to traditions including existentialism, phenomenology, post-
structuralism, and postmodernism. It can apply as well to works conceived in neopragmatist 
ontologies, which seek to overcome the relativism of the other approaches while also avoiding 
reliance on the foundationalism and idealism that characterized fictional works in earlier uses 
of the term novel of ideas. These philosophies are messier, dealing with complexity, historical 
contingency, ambiguity, randomness, and the anxieties that arise from them. Such works use 
plot and narrative not to enact competing philosophies in combat, but rather to explore what 
these approaches mean to the characters standing in for real people as they seek to draw sense 
from the confusion.  
First, I outline the dilemma of exploration and exploitation and suggests how it might be 
translated into the field of fiction. Next, we will examine definitions of the term “novel of 
ideas,” its origins and the uses to which it has been put. We will then consider the controversy 
it has provoked and how the idea of the novel of ideas has been revived, before analyzing it 
using a lens of the dilemma of exploitation and exploration. Through examination of literary 
criticism of works called novels of ideas, I argue that the resurrection of the term has 
something to do with the increasingly complex environment for ideas, that is philosophical 
approaches that seek to cope with complexity and uncertainty through exploration, rather 
staging a confrontation of fixed ideas, which is exploited by the writer to test ideas by enacting 
them in the work.  
II 
In a sense, all fiction – all writing – concerns ideas. LeMahieu says the legendary critic 
and novelist Mary McCarthy saw the term “novel of ideas” not so much contradictory as 
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tautological, particularly among 19th century writers like Herman Melville, George Eliot, 
Honoré de Balzac, or Fyodor Dostoevsky. During that time, “[n]ovels and ideas were … cut 
from the same cloth.”6 However, Iris Murdoch, a philosopher who became a novelist of repute, 
saw a fundamental difference between the disciplines and argued they should be kept apart. 
While philosophy seeks to clarify, she said, “literature is very often mystification.”7  
Nonetheless, Quinton has drawn a distinction between ways that philosophy and fiction 
interact. He speaks of “philosophy in fiction,” where the ideas are expressed indirectly and the 
content is latent, and “philosophy through fiction,” where imaginative literary works 
communicate philosophical conceptions that are already fully worked out. Mikkonen sees this 
as meaning that “literary works are subordinated to the function and purpose of philosophical 
argument.” Plumer sees similarities between these concepts and his two forms of narrative 
argument, one in which the argument is offered overtly and the other, where the narrative as a 
whole expresses the argument.8 Both these formulations describe philosophy that is well 
developed, and the ideas are clear, if disputed. Quinton’s “philosophy in literature” and 
Plumer’s overt philosophy seem to involve writing that presents what Carroll refers to as 
popular philosophy – “philosophy for the masses.” But it begs the question how a work of 
fiction might facilitate what Carroll calls “doing philosophy,”9 that is, supporting a theme with 
an argument, and not just for the masses. To that end this article develops a different 
distinction, contrasting works in which the ideas are well developed with those where the ideas 
themselves are complex, far from settled, and often unsettling.  
In real life, we are bombarded with ideas; they demand our attention and command our 
ability to choose. Among the choices are whether to use an idea already to hand or search 
instead for something different and perhaps better. In epistemology, it involves a choice 
between specialization or innovation.10 For economists, the question is classically one of 
efficiency, that is, the allocation of effort.11 The dilemma drives organizational decision-
making, where situational messiness meets the bounded rationality of human behavior, 
defying simple economic considerations, including decisions about whether to engage in 
research and development.12 This dilemma also plays out in group dynamics: When 
individuals selfishly exploit knowledge discovered by the exploration of other group members 
the term “exploitation” can take on a sinister meaning.13  
We decide whether to explore (i.e., gather information and fresh ideas) or exploit (i.e., use 
known information and ideas for benefit). We may choose based personality factors and 
personal needs, or on whether we are anxious or confident about the future. Doing both at the 
same time strains the attention of individuals and groups, who then never quite specialize and 
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never quite innovate. That creates the “conflicting choice of opting either for a rewarding 
familiar option (i.e., exploitation) or for a novel, uncertain option that may, however, yield a 
better reward in the near future (i.e., exploration).”14 In limited circumstances, the dilemma 
can be resolved, as evidenced by brain scans taken during experiments; these insights are 
increasingly built into the designs of artificial intelligence systems.15 While a recent study 
offers evidence that selective attention to readymade ideas – a term I will examine further 
below – may help individuals overcome this dilemma,16 in many settings, attention is the 
scarce resource. One needs to choose. 
Translated to the realm of fiction, those seeking to engage with ideas would seem to face 
a similar choice. Does a writer exploit well-articulated systems of ideas, finding its drama by 
enacting their conflict and so clarifying the choice between them? Or does a reader – or indeed 
a writer – turn to stories to explore and perhaps clarify the messiness portrayed in the story, 
that is, to look for the philosophical significance of the imagined experience? With this 
distinction in mind, let’s consider the idea of the novel of ideas, historically and critically. 
The concept “novel of ideas” is confusingly vague. According to LeMahieu  the concept 
of a novel of ideas emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, “out of and against a 
modernist aesthetic ideology, l’art pour l’art, which in its most radical form excludes the 
possibility of a novel of ideas.”17 Adherents to modernism set aesthetic value as a final good, 
dismissing as unworthy the instrumental campaigning of some 19th century novels, including 
those of George Eliot and Charles Dickens, and the didactic character of many French novels 
of the 19th century, as well as the works of the Russians Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, and much 
of Goethe’s fiction.  
The novel of ideas is often set in contrast to the work of Henry James, a novelist whom 
T.S. Eliot is said to have described in these terms: “He had a mind so fine that no idea could 
violate it.” Mary McCarthy famously chastised Eliot for that remark; it presented a “snubbing 
notion, radical at the time but by now canon doctrine, of the novel as a fine art and of the 
novelist as an intelligence superior to mere intellect.”18 Holder, however, sees the matter rather 
differently, and in a way that is relevant to the analysis presented in this paper.19 He takes the 
quote from Eliot to mean “that the novelist's mind did not permit any a priori formulations 
about experience to blind it to experience itself.”20  
Among the mid-20th century writers attracting the label “of ideas” were those on both sides 
of the great political-philosophic contests: Fascism versus democracy, Marxism versus 
capitalism, collectivism versus individualism – Arthur Koestler, Aldous Huxley, George 
Orwell, William Golding, Ayn Rand. Another type of work concerned with ideas is that with 
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the threat posed by technology and modern life to individual identity: those by Franz Kafka, 
Thomas Mann, and Robert Musil. In more recent times, however, the term novel of ideas has 
been applied to a wide range of work by writers including Pynchon, Gaddis, Margaret Atwood, 
Don DeLillo, J.M. Coetzee, David Foster Wallace, Ian McEwan and others. Their work is less 
easy to classify, as we shall see. The next step in the process is to examine how critics define 
and use the term novel of ideas. 
As a tool for description or analysis, the term “novel of ideas” has a somewhat checkered 
critical reputation. In 1955, Hoffman defined the concept starting with the negative: “not the 
novel which incidentally illustrates ideas but the novel which uses them in default of 
characterization and other qualities of the traditional narratives.” In the 1999 edition of their 
dictionary of literary terms,21 Cuddon and Preston adopt a dismissive tone in trying to define 
it: 
novel of ideas A vague category of fiction in which conversation, intellectual 
discussion and debate predominate, and in which plot, narrative, emotional 
conflict and psychological depth in characterization are deliberately limited. 
Such a form of novel is perhaps best exemplified by Aldous Huxley's Crome 
Yellow (1921), Point Counter Point (1928) and After Many a Summer 
(1939).22  
Huxley’s own account comes in the voice of his protagonist, the writer Quarles, in the novel 
Point Counter Point:  
Novel of ideas. The character of each personage must be implied, as far as 
possible, in the ideas of which he is the mouthpiece. In so far as theories are 
rationalizations of sentiments, instincts, dispositions of soul, this is feasible. 
The chief defect of the novel of ideas is that you must write about people who 
have ideas.23  
Quarles then complains of how few such people there are, snobbishly illustrating the 
superiority of such authors to mere mortal novelists.24  
Rather than choose explicit imprecision, the mathematician and philosopher John Lane 
Bell employs a broad brush in a recent treatise Philosophy in Literature. His manuscript, 
subtitled “A Survey of the Novel of Ideas,” uses as its criterion for selection those in which 
“philosophical, social, ethical, or scientific ideas play a significant role.” That approach 
embraces a wide range of works in a variety of languages, and two special cases of subject 
matter (political and science fiction). He also explicitly equates “novels of ideas” with 
“philosophical novels.”25 His classification, however, contains many gray areas. 
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Given the range of themes and the variety of approaches such works present, it is not 
surprising that those searching for a definition might settle for calling it “a vague category.” 
Notwithstanding laments in popular criticism about a qualitative decline in the category, or its 
denigration in literary prize-giving, the novel of ideas is an idea and refuses to die. If so, 
perhaps we need better ideas about the novel of ideas.26  
Two such attempts have been made, by Bewes and Ngai, both notable for their dismissal 
of the value in and their moral rejection of a large component of works in this messy category. 
Bewes asserts a normative typology of idea-focused writing that splits the “novel of ideas” 
from those he terms “philosophical fiction.” He denounces the former as manipulative. To 
qualify as philosophical, Bewes states that a work must pass two tests. First, it must explore 
ideas in a way marked by “the absence of authorial predetermination or ulterior motives.” 
Second, it must show “existence of a point of resistance to the values of the objective world.” 
The latter point identifies the novel of ideas as “a work for the market”; to be called 
“philosophical” a “text should not appeal primarily to the market.”27 There are thus “two forms 
of literary dishonesty: the thesis-led manipulation and the market-led gratification of the 
reader.”28 Failing either test makes a work philosophically dishonest.29 He acknowledges that 
some readers will find this argument “excessively crude” and declares his assessment 
“provisional.” But he then makes normative assertions (a philosophical novel “should be a 
meditation”; “the author and the reader should be in quest of a common objective”), which 
color the rest of his argument.30 We will return to these points later, in examining more recent 
fictional works. 
A second critique comes in the long “Readymade Ideas” chapter of Ngai’s book Theory 
of the Gimmick. She describes the concept of the novel of ideas as a response to the industrial 
revolution. Works of ideas-led fiction arose as scientific advances and new technologies raised 
questions about established ontologies. Ngai writes that discussion of it, and even the form 
itself, arose “by most accounts” in the late 1800s. It represented a challenge to the form by 
integrating externally developed concepts, anticipating the direction taken in conceptual art. 
The presentation of ideas, she says, “seems to have pushed a genre [i.e., the novel itself] 
famous for its versatility toward a surprisingly limited repertoire of techniques.”31 In doing so, 
it works against expectations of the form: The didactic replaces nondidactic representation; 
static or simple settings replace complex physical and temporal relations between events and 
their representation; characterization is simplistic and character development limited. They 
rely, in Ngai’s argument, on gimmicks, and gimmicks are the ultimate tricks of the capitalist 
trade, which finds its ultimate form in the use of magic. 
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Both critiques highlight a reduction of complexity in works they think of as novels of 
ideas. The range of narrative devices is narrower. Time can play a lesser role in two ways; 
novels of ideas show time as either linear or suspended. Beyond that, characters embody and 
enact propositions. Problems are examined, even forensically. Monologues replace dialogue. 
LeMahieu makes the argument this way: Because they require spokesmen, novels of ideas 
“struggle not to subordinate plot and character to dialogue and commentary; they struggle, that 
is to say, not to tell more than they show.”32  
These analyses, therefore, challenge and even condemn the category epistemologically. 
These weaknesses, if we chose to judge them so (as Bewes and Ngai do), appear in some of 
the works they analyze, but it is less clear that they are defining characteristics. The differences 
between works in this supposed category are perhaps as great as the similarities. Moreover, 
like the genre of the novel itself, might the works labelled “novels of ideas” demonstrate the 
same sort of “versatility” that Ngai ascribes to the genre as a whole? Has the novel of ideas 
undergone a category creep?  
Both these critiques have roots in a reified conception of fiction and the novel. Each 
presents the novel of ideas as if the novel were a pre-existing Platonic form, against which 
another form –  “of ideas” – is assessed and found wanting. In a sense, they echo the modernist 
attack on much 19th century fiction. For the category to make sense at all, the novel of ideas 
and its synonym or perhaps close sibling, philosophical fiction,33 ought to involve works that 
exhibit strong ties to issues debated in philosophy. But what if we examine instead the works 
in question and assess their similarities and differences, and build categories from the bottom 
up? In keeping with the infinitely flexible form of the novel, what emerges is not a simple 
dichotomy between novels of ideas operating as a system under exterior, philosophic direction, 
as opposed to ones that exhibit a psychologically led focus on interiors in works that fall 
outside this category.34 Nor is it a linear development over time. In the next sections we will 
consider how critics recount the workings of the works they see as novels of ideas, looking 
first George Eliot, with special attention to Middlemarch, then George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eight-Four, and then – through some loops and diversions – to glance at the fictional side of 
science, before moving into more contemporary works. 
III 
George Eliot has attracted attention from popular critics and literary scholars as a writer 
of fiction with philosophical intent. Levine finds ontological and epistemological concerns in 
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her life and fiction. He reminds us of Eliot’s work to complete the G.H. Lewes’s treatise 
Problems of Life and Mind and her extensive interaction with scientists and argues that her 
novel Daniel Deronda can be seen, like Lewes’s Problems, as an attempt to reconcile religion 
and science.35 But Beer, who clearly identifies Eliot’s fictions as novels of ideas, nonetheless 
argues that she stands out among novelists of ideas, with characters that are more the 
mouthpieces, and prose aware of ironies: “Abstract systems and intimate feelings are not kept 
in separate boxes in her writing.”36  
Yet novels of ideas they were. Often seen as describing the emergence of liberalism 
against hierarchy, Eliot’s novels depict the conflict of tradition and individualism. Carroll has 
recently argued that her novels – and particularly the earlier ones, Adam Bede and Mill on the 
Floss – have a different basis: “Irrational or illiberal types of decision-making in Eliot’s novels 
intervene as if by providence and tend to be formally manifest in the trappings of delegitimized 
generic types opposed to realism, such as romance.”37 But this interpretation still makes her a 
writer interested in illustrating the ethical tension emerging in Victorian England’s political 
and social life. 
Indeed, Carlisle asserts that Eliot deserves a place as one of Britain’s leading philosophers. 
Among her many projects, Eliot had translated Spinoza’s ethics treatise from German to 
English. Henson argues that Eliot’s writing is, in effect, a translation of Spinoza’s ethics into 
fiction. By contrast, Fay considers Middlemarch as a kind of philosophical dialogue between 
Eliot and Spinoza, in which the latter’s abstractionism is illustrated as lacking and thus 
undercutting the rightful role of sympathy in human affairs.38 Fay’s more nuanced reading of 
Middlemarch details character development in Dorothea and the failure of Casaubon to 
recognize the human capacity for sympathy. Yet this opposition shows Eliot enacting 
Spinoza’s abstraction against Hume’s priority for passions as a motivator. Whether her novels 
– and Middlemarch in particular – illustrate a philosophy or set philosophies in contrast, they 
use plots and characters to enact these stances.  
More recently, Sater has made the case for an even more subtle reading of the role of 
philosophy in Eliot’s fiction, seeing her as developing an “anti-dogmatic skepticism,” a claim 
that goes “against the grain of Eliot criticism.”39 He draws upon a letter she wrote to a reader, 
Frederick Harrison, who had urged her to expound the positivism of Auguste Comte more 
directly in her next novel. Although sympathetic to Comte, Sater says, Eliot pushed back: 
aesthetics is the “highest of all teachings” because it deals with the “highest complexity”; when 
the aesthetic “lapses” from providing a picture to giving a diagram “it becomes the most 
offensive of all teaching.” Eliot goes on to remark on the “unspeakable pains” she took in 
Donald Nordberg  Enactment or exploration 
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Literature (Johns Hopkins University Press) 9 
writing Romola to achieve idealization, leading her to set the novel in the past.40 The 
implication is that this distance permitted her to escape the complexity of reality. This too 
points to what I have called enactment: Eliot recognizes and values the complexities, though 
she distances herself from them to make the ideas come clear. Extending Sater’s argument, 
Eliot’s skepticism keeps her from committing to single stance; settled philosophical ideas 
contest through her aesthetics for our and her attention.  
IV 
In Orwell’s Nineteen Eight-Four we see a different novel of ideas entirely, though one 
that shares with Eliot the practice of enacting the philosophies in conflict. Rodden asserts that 
arguments in the novels of Henry Fielding, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy may succeed because of 
the richness, the life-like quality of their narratives. But he says richness in not necessary for 
persuasion. He sees Nineteen Eighty-Four as an “argument against political tyranny and 
totalitarianism,” which succeeds despite its heavy plotting and without rich narrative or 
rounded characters because of the close interactions of its themes and the concerns of 
readers.41 Heavy plotting and flat characterization are among the distinguishing – and for many 
critics, the damnable – features of novels of ideas.  
Bell comments on how the novel’s satire has roots in its parody of the discourse of paradox 
and ambiguity employed by the state. He notes that “Newspeak,” the language of the includes 
words like “doublethink,” which involves holding contradictory thoughts while believing 
both.42 While the truth might be clear to Orwell and to the many readers he managed to 
persuade, truth in many fields was becoming increasingly difficult to pin down.43 The 
undercurrent of skepticism that Sater sees in George Eliot was becoming mainstream. We 
might have to settle for belief. 
Plumer discusses how narratives are often discussed as “invitations to imagine.” But he 
contends that fiction that presents arguments shared with scientific, historical and journalistic 
accounts the status of being “invitations to believe.” The test comes less from realistic 
portrayal of life, with its emotional pulls, than from cognitive engagement with the argument: 
not just it is believable, but is it believable under certain rules of the real world? And if so then 
those rules must apply to the real world. Being believable is the starting point.44  
We might be uncomfortable when he suggests that such a state points us to believe in a 
law of nature, which makes the argument of the work “transcendent.” But we believe what we 
read about the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four, despite the novel’s lack of realistic anchors in 
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the world Orwell knew in 1948. That must be because the argument persuades us that 
something in the argumentation for that fictional world corresponds with our experience. 
Orwell’s enactment of the tension between individualism and the collective and the path to 
totalitarianism alerts us to the dangers of the exercise power in an ambiguous world, not to the 
dangers of ambiguity itself. Not long after the publication of the novel, this vice would come 
to be a hallmark of much post-war philosophizing, under the influence not least of the 
philosophy of science, where renewed emphasis on exploration seemed in order, as we 
consider next. 
V 
To open another direction in novels of ideas, let’s look backwards for a moment, drawing 
on Beaumont’s analysis of late 19th century utopian fiction, while keeping the enactment-
exploration dilemma in mind. Beaumont examines the critique of capitalist ideologies in the 
novel Looking Backward, by Edward Bellamy, the critique of Bellamy’s version of socialism 
in William Morris’s novel News from Nowhere, as well as Edwin Abbott’s anonymously 
published Flatland. Utopian fiction, Beaumont writes, is “committed almost by definition to 
looking outside, or questioning at least, the current social formation” and “secretly aspires to 
repair the damaged relations the writers and readers under capitalism.”  While both Bellamy 
and Morris articulate well defined alternatives, Flatland takes us to an imagined universe in 
which equality at first seems manifest in a two-dimensional world, and yet a social structure 
emerges based on the angles of each flat-shaped person.45 This account points us toward the 
view of Flatland as more exploratory than enacting, though still grounded in opposition to the 
emerging social structure of 19th century industrialization. While directing us into an 
uncomfortable and unfamiliar world, Flatland, like News from Nowhere, enacts through 
imagination competing ideas of social and political order. 
As Beaumont recounts, Flatland is also an early example of novels inspired by 
developments in science in the period, perhaps the most profound of which was Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection. With its challenge to convention religion, evolutionary thinking 
undermined established ideas of a hierarchical cosmic order, evolution sets both established 
idealist thought and Utopian-Romantic focus on a transcendent ontology against emerging 
philosophical uncertainties. Philosophically, these scientific advances undermined idealism, 
underpinned skepticism, fueled greater attention to empiricism, and ignited nonfoundational 
approaches of the type we see in American pragmatism. In Europe, the challenges to 
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conventional religious ontologies gave rise to the early existentialist writings of Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche, then Heidegger and what in the 20th century came to be called “continental” 
philosophy.  
Coupled with Einstein’s focus on relativity and Freud’s on the unconscious, fiction writers 
found much to think about in their works, including relativism. Then came Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle, Kuhn’s depictions of scientific revolutions as social constructions, the 
counterintuitive findings of quantum, superstring, and chaos theories. It began to feel as 
though we had lost the anchor-points for the heuristics of philosophical thought – that is, the 
verities – that had previously seemed to order the universe.  
These developments in natural science unsettled more than the physical sciences. Moral 
perspectives, in face not just of the horrors of Nazi Germany but also the prospects of nuclear 
Armageddon, left many seeking for absolutes and finding only relativism. The ideas worked 
their way into artistic and literary life as well. If we fast forward, we can begin to glimpse the 
path separating into one strand, where believability in imagined settings depends on what 
Plumer calls transcendent arguments, and another, more overgrown and difficult to navigate, 
which demands exploration of both ideas and settings that lack the anchor of the transcendent. 
But permit me one more loop before we advance. 
VI 
If the novel of ideas originally referred to the explication of ideas through narrative 
enactment, the term has also been applied, belatedly, to a baffling masterpiece from the heart 
of the Enlightenment. Sometimes called a “postmodern” novel ahead of its time, Laurence 
Sterne’s The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman46 offers a chaotic would-be 
autobiography in which the subject depicts the moment of his own conception and barely 
manages to get past the first day of the self-described gentlemen’s life. Shaffer draws 
similarities with Salman Rushdie’s prose, while Ngai sees Sterne anticipating the forms of 
Musil and Coetzee.47 The work challenged the nascent norms-in-becoming of the English 
novel, frequently turning time on its head, conducting defamiliarization through temporal 
disorientation and misordering of chapter numbers, to confound (and delight) the reader48  and 
defying all correspondence of the narrative to reality.  
Tristram Shandy’s is a life without firm anchor-points, a life not so much socially 
constructed as self-concocted, seemingly random, with a door wide open for interpretation or 
revulsion. One might be tempted to see Shandy, or even Sterne, as a relativist, if one could 
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find a relation between this and anything else. Hawley declares the narrator Shandy to be a 
philosopher, in part through his long digressions to satirize the ideas of the real-life John 
Locke, and in part through his musings about the philosophy of noses (“no more likely to have 
been a branch of academic study then as now,” Hawley adds, with Sterne-like sarcasm).49 It 
is hard to see in this work the presentation of a fixed philosophical stance, except perhaps in 
the way in undermines and mocks contemporary thinking. Instead, Sterne, through Shandy, is 
exploring the nature of reality as viewed through the lens of rationality, only to find the lens 
itself very blurred. In so doing one might be tempted to say he is inventing a language for the 
anti-rationalism, non-foundationalism of philosophers that followed.  
This introduction brings us to the subject of the existence, the ironic, and the magical in 
evidence in fiction some three hundred years later. Let’s look at two of its strands: The first 
are discussions of the technology-led “systems” novels of writers like Gaddis and Pynchon, 
and the second those of the new novels of ideas from more realistic writers like McEwan and 
Coetzee. 
LeClair uses the term “systems novels” to describe Pynchon, John Barth, Gaddis, Robert 
Coover and Don DeLillo, American writers now often discussed as postmodernists. They 
describe living systems are dynamic and self-correcting processes, organized complexity, 
which nonetheless defy “mechanistic study.” Systems thinking, he writes, provided for them 
“a source of ideas and language.” Anchoring the language in this emergent but still alien 
background illustrates the interconnectedness inherent in systems theory. It allows readers to 
explore how systems thinking describes the complexity of human life in a more tangible way 
than the physical and social sciences account afford. In discussing Pynchon, Muth argues that 
if anything LeClair has underplayed the extent to which systems thinking underpins such 
novel. She draws upon the Pynchon’s prior career in missile development at Boeing Company 
to show how concerns for technical writing and programming creates the vocabulary and 
grammar of V. and Gravity’s Rainbow, with implications for readers’ experience of the ideas 
behind the stories they relate.50  
In a rather different way, McEwan’s novels are also viewed as being “of ideas.” Like the 
19th century examples we have seen, McEwan writes of worlds we recognize. But then critical 
opinion divides. According to LeMahieu, his novels present “very old questions and debates: 
faith versus reason, religion versus science, logic versus emotion.”51 Seaboyer agrees but sees 
McEwan as using this “contemporary realism” as a medium to explore these issues through 
analogy and speculative fiction.52 According to Zelewski, McEwan believes that something 
emotionally stirring should happen in novels. “Though he is animated by ideas, he would never 
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plop two characters on a sofa and have them expound rival philosophies.”53 Weston describes 
McEwan’s Atonement as a novel that traces the 20th century’s swing from “modernist 
amorality to postmodern relativism.”54 Viewed against conventional morality, it brings readers 
into an exploration of the troublesome issues about how to choose when anchor-points are 
missing or obscured. It walks us with the characters through the issues at stake without 
resorting to the philosophizing apparent in the works that more obviously enact debates. 
LeMahieu puts it this way: “At times, his novels of ideas enact what they denote – form follows 
content; at other times, their performative function diverges from their constative meaning, 
but, either way, they consistently explore and demonstrate unexpected capabilities of the 
genre. In his novels, ideas animate but never overwhelm aesthetics.”55  
Coetzee’s novels provide another example of how the novel of ideas has morphed in the 
face of philosophical uncertainties, represented less by characters than by the paradoxes their 
activities reveal. Puchner observes that in two of his novels, Diary of a Bad Year and Elizabeth 
Costello, Coetzee has written works that “barely contain the ideas” presented by their 
protagonists, while in The Life and Times of Michael K., the character is barely able to speak. 
In Puchner’s eye, in these and Coetzee’s other work, “ideas are sometimes presented as ready-
made, but they are also embodied, placed in dramatic scenes and feeling characters who tend 
to lose control over them.”56 That is, being readymade does not guarantee the ideas hold 
together. In her chapter on readymade ideas, Ngai notes that after the first of the “lectures” the 
character Elizabeth Costello gives, the “self-cancelling” narrator says that realism “has never 
been comfortable with ideas” and that characters must in some sense embody ideas, even as 
the narrative creates uncertainty whether any of them is worthy of embodiment. This may 
therefore not be one of the “gimmicks” that Ngai wants to identify with the novel of ideas. 
Throughout the book, there is a sense of irony about each of Costello’s pronouncements. If we 
are sure of one thing, it is that Costello’s certainties stand on shaky ground. We explore that 
ground through the narration, never sure of much except that the debate between realism and 
idealism is far from over. 
VII 
What are we to make of this stretch of the category “novel of ideas” to such a range and 
diversity of works? By using the dilemma of exploitation and exploration from psychology as 
a lens to look at the literary criticism and theorizing, this article has illustrated the presence of 
several distinct types of work called novels of ideas, with different narrative techniques and 
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underlying philosophical stances. Applied to social critiques of the 19th century, the novel of 
ideas is a label for works that enact (i.e., exploit) well-articulated sides of an intellectual and 
political debate, sometimes drawing upon advances in evolutionary studies that undermined 
the verities of religion and the social order it created. Advances in technology afforded others 
to explore the possibilities of different ontologies in a genre that quickly came to be called 
science fiction. Still others engaged in debate in political philosophy, using characterization 
and plotting to enact the contestation of ideologies. And through much this time, and before 
it, there have been writers seeking to explore the meaning of complex and unsettled lines of 
reasoning, philosophical stances often labelled by critics as postmodern.57 That these all have 
been categorized as novels of ideas is not particularly surprising, either. It is, you will recall, 
a category that theorists like Cuddon and Preston call “vague.” The recent revival of interest 
in the category, among fiction writers and critics, suggests there is a need for greater clarity. 
The lens used here offers insights that a paper of this length can only hint at. First, the raw 
material for this study has been the writings of critics, not the works themselves. Much could 
be achieved by applying this lens to individual works and authors, and to collaborative fictions 
in drama, on stage and screen, allowing a more meaningful typology to emerge.  
Second, the category itself, as vague as it may be, warrants further critical thinking. Let’s 
recall that the enactment-exploration dilemma is one of attention. As Tversky and Kahneman 
demonstrated, categories overcome attention deficits through heuristics, cognitive shortcuts 
that convey meaning when information is limited. Heuristics rely on being 1) representative 
of a type, 2) available because they work well enough, while 3) providing anchor-points that 
show similarity amid variety.58 But heuristics create biases, one of the most prominent of 
which is confirmation bias: We see what we expect to see. In the world of fiction, the 
conventions of a genre set readers’ expectations. What is novel about a novel, however, is how 
it distinguishes itself from the rest. Confounding such bias through fiction may depend on 
breaking the anchor-points,59 a few examples of which this article has suggested may lie 
behind exploration. It may also be what distinguishes the richer forms of enactment from the 
flat characters and predictable plots associated with works that might be better called novels 
of ideology.60   
Third, what is clear from the revival of interest in the novel of ideas as a form of inquiry 
– among both critics and writers – is the difficulty many writers in our times find in ascribing 
agency and blame. Our available ontologies of interdependence create ambiguities, and moral 
truths seem to be historically contingent. The dangers of relativism lurk everywhere we look. 
These are frequently the problems that the new novels of ideas explore, often without answers.  
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Finally, this approach might be useful in understanding both the mechanisms and the 
philosophies in other types of novels of ideas than the ones examined here. For example, in 
magical realism, the sudden injection of a world that follows different ways to experiment 
with new ideas and explore for truth, not just through the believable, but also the 
unbelievable.61 Could this be why philosophers, like novelists, engage in thought 
experiments?62 The philosopher Simon Blackburn describes David Hume’s empathetic 
argument against narrow rationalism as working in a way that, when we imagine, we “enact 
in our own minds.”63 Perhaps he might have added explore as well.  
The novelist and theorist Milan Kundera, often called a postmodernist,64 wants us to 
remember a difference between the ways that novelists and philosophers think. “Even when 
they express their ideas directly, in their notebooks, the ideas are intellectual exercises, 
paradox games, improvisations, rather than statements of thought.”65 Some philosophers 
might beg to differ. How often might explorations of ideas in fiction be the starting point of 
philosophical reflection? 
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